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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Laura's Case
When Tom and Judy Schubert went out of town for a weekend in 1996,
they thought their seventeen-year-old daughter Laura would be safe at an
"all-nighter" youth event at the family's Pentecostal church.' But during
Sunday evening prayer services, Laura collapsed.2
Believing Laura was possessed by demons, the youth pastor instructed
several young parishioners to perform a common ritual, known as "laying
on hands," to rid Laura of the purported possession.3 As part of the rit-
ual, the minor congregants physically restrained Laura and prayed over
her for more than two hours.4 Laura later testified, "I was being grabbed
by my wrists, on my ankles, on my shoulders, everywhere. I was fighting
with everything I had to get up, I was telling them, no. I was telling them,
let go, leave me alone. They did not respond at all."5 All those present
agree that during the ritual "Laura clenched her fists, gritted her teeth,
1. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. 2008) (detailing
the facts underlying Laura Schubert's lawsuit against Pleasant Glade Assembly of God for
the psychological injuries she suffered following an exorcism performed upon her at church
leaders' direction), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1003 (2009).
2. In re Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1998) (describing Laura's collapse at the altar after testifying before the congregation),
rev'd, 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1003 (2009). Though Laura's symp-
toms were consistent with dehydration and exhaustion, it is undisputed that Laura was also
deeply distressed by an event that occurred at the church on Friday night and about which
she had just testified before collapsing. Id. During the Friday "all-nighter," one member
of the youth congregation claimed to have seen a demon trying to enter the sanctuary. Id.
In response to this declaration, the youth minister and his wife, listed among the defend-
ants in Laura's lawsuit, collected all the children present and had them anoint everything in
the church with holy oil while praying to cast out the demons. Id. The youth minister only
announced the demons defeated at 4:30 a.m., leaving the children with only a short time to
sleep before working at a church garage sale the next day. Id. Laura admitted that the
events of Friday night frightened and exhausted her. Id.
3. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 3 ("During the evening
service, Laura collapsed. After her collapse, several church members took Laura to a
classroom where they 'laid hands' on her and prayed.").
4. Id. at 15 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
[M]embers of Pleasant Glade restrained Schubert on two separate occasions against
her will. During the first encounter, seven members pinned her to the floor for two
hours while she cried, screamed, kicked, flailed, and demanded to be released. This
violent act caused Schubert multiple bruises, carpet bums, scrapes, and injuries to her
wrists, shoulders, and back .... Fifteen minutes later, at the direction of Pleasant
Glade's youth pastor, a different group of seven church members physically restrained
her for an hour longer.
Id. (emphasis in original).
5. Id. Despite her vehement resistance, Laura was not let alone until she calmed
down and complied with orders to say the name "Jesus." Id. at 4 (majority opinion).
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foamed at the mouth, made guttural noises, cried, yelled, kicked,
sweated, and hallucinated." 6 After the church members released Laura,
she was so weak from exhaustion that she could barely stand on her own.7
Despite the terrifying experience, Laura remained at the church and
continued to participate in youth activities over the next two days.8 But
on Wednesday evening, she collapsed again and began writhing on the
floor.9 The youth pastor directed the other young parishioners to restrain
Laura while the church's senior pastor was summoned."a Upon his arri-
val, the senior pastor placed his hand on Laura's forehead and prayed for
her while the youth parishioners continued to hold her down, spread-
eagled, crying, screaming, and thrashing on the floor.1" During the event,
Laura suffered only carpet burns, scrapes, and minor bruises on her back,
wrists, and shoulders.12 Shortly thereafter, Laura and her family resigned
their membership from the church.13
6. Id. at 3 (majority opinion) (describing Laura's behavior during the incident). The
parties disagreed, however, as to the cause of Laura's actions. Id. Church members con-
tended, without substantiation, that Laura's actions may have been a ploy for attention,
rather than the result of her restraint. Id.
7. Id. at 15 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
8. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 4 (majority opinion)
("On Monday and Tuesday, Laura continued to participate in church-related activities
without any problems, raising money for Vacation Bible School and preparing for youth
drama productions.").
9. Id. During Wednesday evening services, Laura was still shell-shocked from Sunday
night's laying on hands ritual, and she resisted another youth congregant when he at-
tempted to put his arm around her. Id. at 15 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting). Not wanting to
be touched, Laura testified, "I tried to scoot away from him. He scooted closer. He was
more persistent. Finally, his grasp on me just got hard ... before I knew it, I was being
grabbed again." Id.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id. at 15 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
According to Laura, the youth, under the direction of [the youth pastor] and his wife,
Holly, held her down. Laura testified, moreover, that she was held in a "spread eagle"
position with several youth members holding down her arms and legs. The church's
senior pastor, Lloyd McCutchen, was summoned to the youth hall where he played a
tape of pacifying music, placed his hand on Laura's forehead, and prayed.
Id. at 4 (majority opinion).
12. Id. at 4 (majority opinion) (describing the physical injuries that Laura suffered
from the incident).
13. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2008) (stating
that Laura's parents decided to leave the church because of their disappointment with how
the church ministers and members treated their daughter), cert denied, 129 S.Ct. 1003
(2009).
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Though Laura's physical injuries from the incidents were slight, she im-
mediately exhibited signs of psychological trauma.14 As later detailed by
the Texas Supreme Court:
Over the next months, several psychologists and psychiatrists ex-
amined Laura, documenting her multiple symptoms, such as angry
outbursts, weight loss, sleeplessness, nightmares, hallucinations, self-
mutilation, fear of abandonment, and agoraphobia. Despite the psy-
chiatric counseling, Laura became increasingly depressed and sui-
cidal, eventually dropping out of her senior year of high school and
abandoning her former plan to attend Bible College and pursue mis-
sionary work. Finally, in November 1996, Laura was diagnosed as
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, which the doctors asso-
ciated with her physical restraint at the church in June 1996. One of
the expert witnesses at trial testified that Laura would "require ex-
tensive time to recover trust in authorities, spiritual leaders, and her
life-long religious faith." Ultimately, Laura was classified as disabled
by the Social Security Administration and began drawing a monthly
disability check. 5
Laura and her parents later sued the church, the youth pastor, the se-
nior pastor, and other church members for, inter alia, negligence, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), false imprisonment, assault,
battery, and child abuse. 6 A jury awarded Laura damages for her
mental, emotional, and psychological injuries resulting from the two inci-
dents, and the court of appeals remanded with orders to dismiss.1 7
14. Id. at 4-5 (listing Laura's emotional symptoms).
15. Id.
Laura's family strongly believed that the church's actions "caused Laura 'mental, emo-
tional and psychological injuries including physical pain, mental anguish, fear, humilia-
tion, embarrassment, physical and emotional distress, post-traumatic stress disorder,
and loss of employment."'
Id. at 5.
16. Id. at 5.
17. In re Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85, 88-90 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1998) (finding that church leaders had a protected free exercise right to engage in
laying on hands and, therefore, could not be liable for negligent or intentional infliction of
emotional distress), rev'd, 264 S.W. 3d 1 (Tex. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1003 (2009).
"Regarding negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the First Amendment
gives Pleasant Glade the right to engage in driving out demons-intangible or emotional
harm cannot ordinarily serve as a basis for maintaining a tort cause of action against a
church for religious practices." Id. at 89.
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The Texas Supreme Court reversed the jury's findings. a8 The divided
majority concluded that Laura failed to state a cognizable, secular claim
and dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.19 In his opinion for the
majority, Justice David Medina cited a twenty-year-old Ninth Circuit
opinion asserting that emotional or intangible harms generally cannot
form the basis of a personal injury claim against a church for religiously
motivated conduct involving its members.2 ° The court further concluded
that Laura's claim for IIED, in particular, would necessarily require for-
bidden inquiry into the verity of the church's religious belief in possession
by malevolent forces.2" According to the majority, even though the ele-
ments of the alleged tort are based on secular principles of law, the appli-
cation of those elements to a church engaged in religious conduct would
intrude upon the church's free exercise right to interpret religious doc-
trine and apply it to its parishioners. 2
In the final lines of the decision, the court commented on the fact that
laying on hands is a common practice in the church and "not normally
dangerous or unusual."2 3 Thus, the court found that because the practice
is both accepted and expected by parishioners, the fact "[t]hat a particu-
lar member may find the practice emotionally disturbing and non-consen-
sual when applied to her does not transform the dispute into a secular
matter."24 The majority concluded with the bare assertion that while a
parishioner might foreseeably have a compensable claim for emotional
damages resulting from a church's religiously motivated conduct, Laura's
case did not present such a claim.2
18. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 2 (concluding that
"the case as tried, presents an ecclesiastical dispute over religious conduct that would un-
constitutionally entangle the court in matters of church doctrine").
19. Id. at 13 ("Because determining the circumstances of Laura's emotional injuries
would, by its very nature, draw the Court into forbidden religious terrain, we conclude that
Laura has failed to state a cognizable, secular claim to this case.").
20. Id. at 8 (citing Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 819 F.2d 875, 883
(9th Cir. 1987)) ("Therefore, '[a] religious organization has a defense of constitutional priv-
ilege to claims that it has caused intangible harms-in most, if not all, circumstances."'
(quoting Paul, 819 F.2d at 883)).
21. Id. at 9 ("This type of intangible, psychological injury, without more, cannot ordi-
narily serve as a basis for a tort claim against a church or its members for its religious
practices.").
22. Id. at 11 (dismissing Justice Paul W. Green's dissenting argument that Laura's
claim could still be adjudicated on "neutral principles of tort law"). The majority found
that Laura's claims were inseparable from both the congregation's beliefs in demonic pos-
session and Laura's internalization of church leaders' discussion of those beliefs. Id.
23. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 12-13.
24. Id. at 13.
25. Id.
20091
THE SCHOLAR
B. The Problem
Laura's case illustrates a contentious issue in free exercise jurispru-
dence: should parishioners be permitted to recover for purely intangible
damages caused by the religiously motivated conduct of churches and
other religious actors? Numerous courts and scholars have struggled with
this question but have failed to reach an overriding consensus.26
This complex and nuanced constitutional issue must be carefully evalu-
ated with consideration for both religious actors' free exercise rights and
parishioners' rights to physical and emotional integrity. First, a reviewing
court must determine whether constitutional rights are implicated by a
particular controversy. Free exercise is not threatened when the church
conduct is not religiously compelled, as when a child is sexually abused by
a renegade pastor or priest.2 ' But when the disputed conduct is funda-
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits courts from deciding issues of religious doctrine.
Here, the psychological effect of church belief in demons and the appropriateness of
its belief in "laying hands" are at issue. Because providing a remedy for the very real,
but religiously motivated emotional distress in this case would require us to take sides
in what is essentially a religious controversy, we cannot resolve that dispute.
Id.
26. See, e.g., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 762
P.2d 46, 63 (Cal. 1988) (finding that whether the church conduct was sufficiently outra-
geous to uphold a claim for IIED is a question of fact, thereby precluding summary judg-
ment based on the church's free exercise defense), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989). The
court also maintained, however, that the church's practice of "Heavenly Deception," or
lying to prospective adherents in order to provide them the opportunity to hear the rever-
end's teachings, is purely religious conduct that cannot give rise to liability for fraud. Id. at
58; Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 775 (Okla. 1989) (denying
recovery for emotional damages sustained by a Church of Christ congregant after church
leaders publicly condemned her for having an extra-marital affair in violation of church
teachings). Though Guinn was unable to recover for injuries incurred during her member-
ship in the church, she was permitted recovery for her injuries sustained during the period
after her resignation from the congregation, during which church leaders continued to de-
fame her publicly. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 783; see also MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A.
DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 867-83 (1996) (discussing the
various issues raised by application of the free exercise defense in tort law); Paul T. Hay-
den, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Dis-
tress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 579, 581
(1993) (arguing for application of the free exercise defense to all claims for IIED brought
against religious organizations). "Through its remedial and substantive aspects, the tort
threatens both defendants' right of religious freedom and society's important interesting in
tolerating differing religious views." Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous"
Conduct: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's
Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 579, 581 (1993).
27. Jones ex rel. Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 931 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (stating
that the First Amendment does not protect conduct that has nothing to do with religious
creed); see also Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 124 (Mass. 1985) (imposing liability
against clerical superiors for inducing a minister's psychiatrist to disclose confidential pa-
[Vol. 12:95
RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE
mental to the expression of legitimately held religious beliefs, such as the
laying on hands ritual in Laura's case ,28 courts must decide whether as-
sessing liability for the conduct impedes the church's right to free exer-
cise.29 If it does, the question becomes whether the burden on free
exercise is justified in furtherance of some other legitimate end, namely,
compensating the plaintiff for her injuries.
In cases like Laura's, in which religious conduct became violent be-
cause of the plaintiff's vehement resistance to it and resulted in severe
emotional disturbance, 30 courts must balance the constitutionally pro-
tected right of religious actors to the free exercise of their beliefs against
the fundamental right of plaintiffs to physical and emotional security.3"
The balancing act becomes more difficult as the religious significance of
the act increases and the degree of the plaintiff's injuries diminishes.
Even more challenging are cases in which the violent conduct resulted in
no physical injury but did cause severe emotional harm. At what point
should the plaintiff have to bear the burden of her psychological injuries
in favor of the defendant's right to unobstructed worship?
tient information), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985); Olson v. First Church of Nazarene,
661 N.W.2d 254, 265-66 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (permitting claim for IIED and negligence
against pastor who had an illicit sexual affair with parishioner-plaintiff's wife, but not
against the church); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing
claim for, inter alia, IIED based on minister's divulgence to the congregation of confiden-
tial information from plaintiffs' counseling sessions); Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235,
1244 (Ohio 1988) (immunizing church against IIED liability for errant minister's sexual
relationship with parishioner-plaintiff's ex-wife); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology,
644 P.2d 577, 602-03 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (finding religious organization not exempt from
liability for fraud if statements by organization's agents do not concern the religious beliefs
or practices of the organization), rev. denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1206 (1983).
28. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 3 (describing Laura's
experience).
29. Id. at 12 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. and Can. v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1976); Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 396 (Tex.
2007)) (explaining the dilemma that courts face when a claim for lIED is based on a funda-
mental religious practice). "Although the Free Exercise Clause does not categorically in-
sulate religious conduct from judicial scrutiny, it prohibits courts from deciding issues of
religious doctrine." Id.
30. Id. at 18 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting) ("[This case] is about violent action-specifi-
cally, twice pinning a screaming, crying teenage girl to the floor for extended periods of
time.").
31. See id. at 16 ("It is a basic tenet of tort law that emotional damages may be recov-
ered for intentional torts involving physical invasions, such as assault, battery, and false
imprisonment." (citations omitted)).
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32Courts and scholars have yet to agree upon an answer to this query.
Several jurisdictions have taken the same approach as the Texas Supreme
Court, shying away from the issue altogether by labeling these claims too
perilously intertwined with religious doctrine for review by the secular
judiciary.33 Particularly regarding claims for lIED, which requires only
that the defendant's conduct be "extreme and outrageous, '34 some fear
that any evaluation of the conduct would compel judges and juries to
determine the verity and acceptability of particular religious beliefs."
Some advocate completely barring claims for IIED in these cases, arguing
that the free exercise rights of unpopular minority religions cannot be
adequately protected when subject to this type of liability.36
32. Compare Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 819 F.2d 875, 880 (9th
Cir. 1987) ("When the imposition of liability would result in the abridgement of the right to
free exercise of religious beliefs, recovery in tort is barred."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926
(1987), with Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 762 P.2d
46, 56-57 (Cal. 1988) (holding that government action burdening free exercise may with-
stand constitutional scrutiny if it is the least burdensome and non-discriminatory means of
achieving a compelling, secular governmental interest), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989),
and MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 8
(2005) ("Every citizen has at least as much right to be free from harm as the religious entity
has to be free from government regulation.").
33. See, e.g., Glass v. First United Pentecostal Church, 676 So. 2d 724, 732 (La. Ct.
App. 1996) ("It is without question that religious organizations are no longer immune from
tort liability. However, the cloak of the religious protections of the First Amendment re-
mains to bar certain actions on the basis of the wall of separation between the church and
state."); Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 774 (Okla. 1989) ("The
trial court's refusal to give summary judgment to the Elders on Parishioner's [pre-resigna-
tion] tort claims and its adjudication of this protected conduct constituted a governmental
burden on the Church of Christ's right to its free exercise of religion."); Tilton v. Marshall,
925 S.W.2d 672, 677 (Tex. 1996) ("[W]hen a plaintiff's suit implicates a defendant's free
exercise rights, the defendant may assert the First Amendment as an affirmative defense to
the claims against him.").
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965) ("One who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another
is subject to liability for such emotional distress.").
35. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 579, 583 (1993) (calling for a restriction on IIED "in a manner that would result in
greater protection of religious freedom"). "Such a restriction, perhaps a radical one, is
fully justified because the adjudication of these intentional infliction claims embroils courts
in forbidden inquires." Id. at 583-84. "[T]he tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress is a powerful weapon against socially intolerable conduct. Indeed, it is one of the
most sweeping causes of action in all of tort law." Id. at 581.
36. E.g., id. (arguing for restricting the scope and viability of claims for IIED when
brought against religious entities acting in a religious context).
I suggest the need for courts, utilizing traditional common law powers, to restrict the
scope of this particular common law tort in a manner that would result in greater
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Unfortunately, as evidenced by Laura's case, the timidity of courts
faced with these challenging claims often leaves legitimate victims of re-
ligiously motivated violence without a legal remedy.37 This raises yet an-
other dilemma: how can courts preserve religious liberty in these cases
without denying parishioners the same legal protections as secular citi-
zens? Had Laura been forcibly held against her will by students at her
public high school, rather than by other members of her church, the
courts would not hesitate to evaluate her claims for emotional injury.3 8
By refusing to do so, courts permit religious groups to injure their mem-
bers with impunity under the cloak of religious justification.3 9 This espe-
cially holds true for women and children adherents of minority religions,
who are particularly vulnerable to religiously motivated violence.4 ° If
courts continue to recoil from these lawsuits, those individuals most in
need of legal protection will remain marginalized and vulnerable.
protection of religious freedom, broadly defined, and in the accordance of greater
weight to the societal interest in tolerating various religious beliefs.
Id.
37. See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD Vs. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF
LAW 8-9 (2005) (arguing that religious entities have worked diligently to immunize their
conduct from the law and have been lobbying for the privilege of hurting others with no
repercussions).
38. See Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 762 P.2d
46, 61 (Cal. 1988) (suggesting that because a nonreligious organization engaged in the same
fraudulent conduct as the defendant-religious organization would be held legally liable for
its conduct, the defendant should not be excused from liability merely because of its relig-
ious affiliation), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
39. See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF
LAW 10 (2005) (arguing that exemptions for religious entities from generally applicable
laws have led to nationwide tolerance of abuse of congregants, most of which is never
reported).
40. See, e.g., id. at 24 (describing the situation in the border towns of Colorado City,
Arizona and Hildale, Utah, in which the secretive and reclusive Fundamentalist Church of
Latter-day Saints sect sanctions physical and sexual abuse of children while local authori-
ties, themselves members of the sect, turn a blind eye to the violations); J. P. LARSSON,
UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE: THINKING OUTSIDE THE Box ON TERRORISM
30-31 (2004) (analyzing religious violence as it manifests in families and on the individual
level); Sima Wali, Muslim Refugee, Returnee, and Displaced Women: Challenges and Di-
lemmas, in FAITH AND FREEDOM: WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 175,
182 (Mahnaz Afkhami ed., 1995) (discussing the subjugation of females in Muslim refugee
communities and the use of religion to justify the abuse). "The tragedy visited upon up-
rooted populations in general, and upon women and girls specifically, produces unfathom-
able, lifelong psychological effects." Sima Wali, Muslim Refugee, Returnee, and Displaced
Women: Challenges and Dilemmas, in FAITH AND FREEDOM: WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE MUSLIM WORLD 175, 182 (Mahnaz Afkhami ed., 1995).
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C. The Solution
I propose that, in order for courts faced with these claims to protect
both religious freedom and parishioners' rights, the free exercise defense
should only be permitted where the allegedly tortious conduct is nonvio-
lent. In other words, the nature of the religious conduct, rather than the
nature of the plaintiff's injuries, should determine the applicability of the
defense. This standard affords courts a clear directive for deciding these
difficult cases by drawing a bright line between conduct that is always
permissible free exercise and conduct that should always be subject to
judicial scrutiny.
Following this Introduction, Part II discusses the history of the Free
Exercise Clause as a defense to parishioners' claims for emotional dam-
ages. Part II attempts to distinguish those cases in which claims against
religious organizations were upheld and those in which claims for emo-
tional damages and IIED were rejected. In Part III, I present my critique
of the traditional rejection of claims for intangible harms in religious con-
duct cases. I argue this approach to the law leaves members of minority
religions, particularly women and children, vulnerable to religiously moti-
vated abuse and denies this class of persons the same legal rights as other
citizens. This section further explores my proposal for an alternative ap-
proach to the problem: permitting recovery for emotional injuries and
IIED where the religious conduct is violent, as opposed to merely pas-
sive, nonviolent behavior or religious speech. Finally, in Part IV, I con-
clude by discussing how my alternative approach adequately protects the
free exercise rights of defendants while still compensating the victims of
abuse.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE FREE EXERCISE DEFENSE
A. The Free Exercise Clause and Government Regulation of Religious
Conduct
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' Courts have traditionally con-
strued this provision to restrain the government from suppressing the
profession or promulgation of religious beliefs.4" Delineating between
41. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
42. E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878) (discussing legislation
proposed prior to the passage of the Bill of Rights defining the Founders' notions of relig-
ious freedom).
[RIeligious freedom is defined; and after a recital 'that to suffer the civil magistrate to
intrude his powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propaga-
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what is the province of the government to regulate and what is absolutely
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the United States Supreme Court,
quoting Thomas Jefferson, declared it the duty of civil government to in-
terfere in religious principle only when that principle manifests as "overt
acts against the peace and good order of society."43 In 1940, the Court
applied this doctrine to the states.44
The Supreme Court has consistently distinguished between religious
belief and religiously motivated conduct, finding the former inviolable by
civil authority and the latter within government's prerogative to regulate
or even proscribe in the interests of society.45 The Court explained in
Reynolds v. United States, "Laws are made for the government of actions,
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions,
they may with practices. ' '46 To permit religious adherents to knowingly
and intentionally break the law with impunity for their religious beliefs
would, the Court warned, enable every citizen to place himself above the
law.47 Thus, in order to protect freedom of belief itself, courts must dis-
tinguish it from conduct and regulate the latter accordingly.48
Resolving alleged infringements upon the free exercise of religion, the
threshold question courts must answer is whether resolution of the claim
tion of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy which at
once destroys all religious liberty,' it is declared 'that it is time enough for the rightful
purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into
overt acts against peace and good order.' In these two sentences is found the true
distinction between what properly belongs to the church and what to the State.
Id.
43. Id. (discussing the government's limited ability to interfere with religious activity).
44. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (recognizing that although
the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the concepts of freedom to believe and act,
"[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society"). "The freedom to
act must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection." Id.;
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.").
45. See, e.g., Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04 ("Thus the Amendment embraces two con-
cepts, -freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society."); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. The Reynolds Court elaborated:
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship,
would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could
not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to
burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power
of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
46. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
47. Id. at 167.
48. Id. at 166.
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would require a judicial determination of the truth or falsehood of a relig-
ious belief.4 9 If resolution of the claim would require such a determina-
tion, the issue is one of religious belief and is, thus, beyond the discretion
of the courts to review. 50 Courts are equally without license to resolve
matters that are purely ecclesiastical in nature.51 The Supreme Court has
defined such purely ecclesiastical matters as those concerning "theologi-
cal controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the con-
formity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required
of them.",52 Courts may, however, question whether or not a religious
belief is sincerely held by the party or religious organization claiming free
exercise protection.53
Religious groups are never protected by the Free Exercise Clause when
their conduct is neither religious in nature nor religiously motivated.54
49. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (finding that the First Amend-
ment precludes putting questions of the verity of religious beliefs before juries).
50. See id. ("The law knows of no heresy, and is committed to the support of no
dogma, the establishment of no sect." (citation omitted)).
51. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1871).
[N]o jurisdiction has been conferred on the tribunal to try the particular case before it,
or that in its judgment, it exceeds the powers conferred upon it, or that the laws of the
church do not authorize the particular form of proceeding adopted; and in a sense of
ten used in the courts, all of those may be said to be questions of jurisdiction.
Id.
52. Id.
But it is easy to see that if the civil courts are to inquire into all these matters... [they]
may, and must, be examined into minuteness and care, for they would become, in
almost every case, the criteria by which the validity of the ecclesiastical decree would
be determined in the civil court.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
53. Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Tex. 1996) ("[W]hile courts have the ca-
pacity to inquire into the sincerity of a person's beliefs, the First Amendment prohibits
courts from determining the veracity of religious tenet.... To avoid conducting 'heresy
trials,' courts may not adjudicate the truth or falsity of religious doctrines or beliefs." (cita-
tion omitted)).
54. See, e.g., Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 185-86 (Mass. 1985) (imposing liabil-
ity against church for tortiously inducing minister's psychiatrist to disclose confidential pa-
tient information), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985); Olson v. First Church of Nazarene,
661 N.W.2d 254, 265-66 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (ruling that the courts have jurisdiction
over a claim of IED and negligence for a pastor having an affair with a church member's
wife); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 560 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that a party
can raise an IED claim against a minister's unlawful actions that are not religious in na-
ture); Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1244 (Ohio 1988) (holding that a church cannot
be held liable under agency principles for a pastor's negligence that was not associated with
the pastor's duties for the church); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577,
603 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (finding religious organization not exempt from liability for fraud
if statements by organization's agents do not concern the religious beliefs or practices of
the organization), rev. denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
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For instance, the Fifth Circuit overruled a Baptist minister's free exercise
defense to allegations of malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, rea-
soning that because he was engaged in secular marital counseling at the
time the alleged torts were committed, he could not be exempted from
civil liability.55 Similarly, in a New York civil case, a Catholic church was
found not liable for the conduct of a priest accused of sexually molesting
a minor congregant, as the priest's conduct was unauthorized and in vio-
lation of church canons.5 6
While the secular conduct of religious groups and individuals is always
subject to governmental regulation, courts must determine whether regu-
lations or prohibitions of conduct impermissibly burden free exercise.5 7
In two important decisions, the Supreme Court judged facially neutral
laws against claims that the laws unduly burdened the right of some relig-
ious adherents to observe their religious rituals.58 In both cases, the
55. Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1998).
Although [minister's] contention that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the judiciary
from reviewing the conduct of those involved in relationships that are not purely secu-
lar in nature might, if adopted, foster the development of some important spiritual
relationships by eliminating the possibility of civil or criminal liability for participating
members of the clergy, the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom cannot be
construed to protect secular beliefs and behavior, even when they comprise part of an
otherwise religious relationship between a minister and a member of his or her con-
gregation. To hold otherwise would impermissibly place a religious leader in a pre-
ferred position in out society.
Id. at 336 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
56. Jones ex rel. Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 933 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992)
("[P]laintiffs have tendered no case in this jurisdiction imposing respondeat superior liabil-
ity for intentional sexual misconduct by an employee, which on its own face scarcely seems
to fall within the scope of employment of a priest."(emphais original)).
57. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
58. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993). In
Lukumi Babalu Aye, residents of Hialeah, Florida responded to a Santeria church's an-
nouncement of plans to establish a house of worship within city limits by passing a resolu-
tion noting residents' "concern" over the church's ritual slaughter and sacrifice of animals.
Id. at 523-31. Residents condemned the sacrifices as inconsistent with public morals and
passed several ordinances banning the practice of slaughtering animals only for religious
purposes. Id. One ordinance defined "sacrifice" as "'to unnecessarily kill ... an animal in
a . . .ritual .. .not for the primary purpose of food consumption,' and prohibit[ed] the
'possess[ion], sacrifice, or slaughter' of an animal if it is killed in 'any type of ritual.' ..."
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court found the ordinances not neutral, as they were clearly
targeted at members of the church, not generally applicable because of exemptions for
butchers and other non-religious entities, and not justified by any overriding governmental
interest. Id. at 546; Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
885 (1990). In Employment Division, two members of the Native American Church were
fired from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation center for ingesting peyote, a halluci-
nogenic drug, for sacramental purposes. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 874. When the
State of Oregon denied them unemployment benefits based on the illegal substance use,
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Court held that in order for a law to withstand constitutional scrutiny, it
must be both neutral in effect and generally applicable, and it must be the
least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest.59
When the disputed law meets all three criteria, the state has the discre-
tion to accommodate a violation committed for religious reasons, but it is
not obligated to do so.6"
When a law does disproportionately burden a particular religious prac-
tice, courts have found the burden permissible where the religious prac-
tice overtly disturbs societal notions of peace and good order.6 1 For
instance, in Reynolds, a federal law proscribing bigamy was found consti-
tutional as applied to a Mormon man with two wives.6 2 Though the
Court acknowledged that bigamy in the United States was practiced al-
most exclusively by Mormons, it nonetheless upheld the prohibition on
grounds that the practice has always been considered "odious" in Anglo-
American society.63 In light of the established holding of Reynolds, sub-
the fired church members alleged that their First Amendment free exercise rights were
violated by the denial. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing Oregon's high court, found
that because the prohibition on peyote use was both facially neutral and generally applica-
ble, the fact that it incidentally burdened some religious practices did not mandate a relig-
ious exemption for those burdened practitioners. Id. at 884. According to the Court, "The
government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful con-
duct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot depend on measur-
ing the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development."'
Id. at 885 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451
(1988)).
59. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531-32 ("A law failing to satisfy these require-
ments must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tai-
lored to advance that interest."); Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 885; see also Thomas v.
Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Tilton v. Marshall,
925 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Tex. 1996).
60. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 888.
61. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163-66 (1878) (upholding anti-polygamy
laws as applied to Mormons). But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-37 (1972)
(finding no such violation of societal peace and good order where Amish parents withdrew
their children from public school after the eighth grade in violation of a state law requiring
all children to attend school until age sixteen).
62. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. The court reasoned:
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the
United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man
excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government
could exist only in name under such circumstances.
Id. at 166-67.
63. Id. at 164. Reflecting a somewhat racist rationale, the Court explained:
Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe,
and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature
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sequent courts continue to balance the interests of society as a whole
against the constitutional liberties of the burdened religion's adherents.64
Another important free exercise consideration applies to conduct in-
volving minors.65 Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state has an
obligation to protect those members of society who are unable to protect
themselves, including children.66 Accordingly, the Supreme Court con-
cluded in Prince v. Massachusetts that the government has a particular
interest in the health and well-being of youth.67 The Court asserted, "The
right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the
community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health
or death.",68 In order to resolve a claimed infringement upon free exer-
of the life of Asiatic and of African people. At common law, the second marriage was
always void . . . and from the earliest history of England polygamy has been treated as
an offence against society.
Id.
64. E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (finding Connecticut's in-
terest in licensing solicitation of funds not to outweigh the free exercise rights of Jehovah's
Witnesses who were arrested for inciting breach of the peace by soliciting publicly); Al-
berts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 123 (Mass. 1985) ("A law, legislatively or judicially cre-
ated, that would regulate or prevent religiously motivated conduct does not violate the
First Amendment if the State's interest in the law's enforcement outweighs the burden that
the law imposes on the free exercise of religion."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985).
65. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (upholding prosecution
of Jehovah's Witnesses for using children to distribute religious literature in violation of
child labor laws). The Supreme Court noted:
[N]either rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation acting to
guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict
the parent's control by requiring school attendance. Regulating or prohibiting the
child's labor and in many other ways it's authority is not unified merely because the
parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or
conscience.
Id. (citations omitted).
66. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004). Parens patriae is defined as:
[Latin "parent of his or her country"] 1.) The state regarded as a sovereign; the state in
its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves the attor-
ney general acted as parens patriae in the administrative hearing. 2.) A doctrine by
which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, esp. on
behalf of someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit parens patriae
allowed the state to institute proceedings.
Id.
67. Prince, 321 U.S. at 165-66. The Court stated:
It is in the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be safe-
guarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent
well-developed men and citizens .... Acting to guard the general interest in youth's
well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control.
Id. (emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 166-67 (citing People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243, 246-47 (N.Y. 1903)). In fact,
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cise, the Court proposed that the government action must fail unless it
can be demonstrated "to be necessary for or conducive to the child's pro-
tection against some clear and present danger" posed by the religious
practice.69 Therefore, while courts are generally hesitant to scrutinize the
conduct of religious groups with respect to their members, church con-
duct involving children is subject to sharper scrutiny.7"
B. The Free Exercise Clause as a Defense to Tort Liability for
Religious Conduct
When a party seeks civil damages against a church or individual en-
gaged in religiously motivated conduct, courts have found that state laws
permitting recovery in tort constitute state action subject to the limita-
tions imposed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.71 Conse-
quently, courts cannot uphold civil liability where the tort action itself
violates a person's or group's right to free exercise.72 In such cases, cer-
tain forms of conduct, such as indoctrination and initiation procedures,
are generally beyond the authority of the civil courts to evaluate.73 In
addition, churches are generally afforded wide latitude in the discipline of
their own members. 74 As the Supreme Court noted, "To permit civil
courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a hier-
The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of
adults. This is peculiarly true of public activities and matters of employment. A dem-
ocratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of
young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this
against impeding restraints and dangers, within a broad range of selection.
Id. at 168.
69. Id. at 167.
70. See id. at 171 (noting that the Court's holding in Prince is limited to the facts of
that case alone). "We [do not] lay the foundation for any (that is, every) state intervention
in the indoctrination and participation of children in religion which may be done 'in the
name of their health and welfare.'..." Id.
71. See Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 819 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir.
1987) ("State law ... including tort rules, constitute state action.").
72. Id. at 883 ("When the imposition of liability would result in the abridgement of
the right to free exercise of religious beliefs, recovery in tort is barred.").
73. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 708 (1976) (concluding that the courts did not have the power to evaluate hierarchical
authority over the defrockment of a bishop); Paul, 819 F.2d at 883 (dismissing a claim
against a Jehovah's Witness congregation for, among other things, lIED, brought by a for-
mer member who was shunned by fellow congregants); Turner v. Unification Church, 473
F. Supp. 367, 371 (D.R.I. 1978) (denying courts the authority to evaluate indoctrination
and initiation procedures), affd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); Rasmussen v. Bennett, 741
P.2d 755, 759 (Mont. 1987) (refusing to evaluate ecclesiastical condemnation of parishioner
conduct).
74. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 708; Paul, 819 F.2d at 883; Smith v.
Calvary Christian Church, 614 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Mich. 2000).
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archical church so as to decide ... religious law (governing church polity)
... would violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil
determination of religious doctrine."75
Similarly, in claims involving civil liability, courts are reluctant to delve
into the conduct of churches with respect to their current and former pa-
rishioners.76 As a general rule, courts tend to adhere to the view es-
poused by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in Prince,7 in which
he argued that the relationship between churches and their parishioners
ought to be as close to absolutely free as possible.7 8
For instance, in an Oklahoma case, the court's decision ultimately
turned upon the plaintiff's status as a member of the defendant church.7 9
In that case, the plaintiff sued for invasion of privacy and IIED after
church leaders publicly chastised her before the Church of Christ congre-
gation for having an extramarital affair in violation of church canons.8 °
Rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the court concluded that the allegedly tor-
tious conduct occurring prior to the plaintiff's resignation from the
church was constitutionally protected, as it did not pose a significant
threat to public health, safety, or welfare.8 According to the court, the
plaintiff's willing submission to church dogma and discipline, coupled
with the church leaders' reliance upon that submission, protected the
church against liability for its election to internally discipline the plaintiff
75. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709 (citing Md. and Va. Eldership of
Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970)).
76. See Paul, 819 F.2d at 883 (refusing to uphold liability for congregation's shunning
of an excommunicated parishioner). See generally Alan Stephens, Annotation, Free Exer-
cise of Religion Clause of First Amendment as Defense to Tort Liability, 93 A.L.R. FED. 754
(1989) (surveying courts' acceptance or rejection of the free exercise defense within a vari-
ety of tort claims, including IIED).
77. See, e.g., Paul, 819 F.2d at 883 ("Courts generally do not scrutinize closely the
relationship among members (or former members) of a church. Churches are afforded
great latitude when they impose discipline on members or former members.").
78. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice
Jackson explained:
My own view may be shortly put: I think the limits begin to operate whenever activi-
ties begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public. Religious activi-
ties which concern only members of the faith are and ought to be free-as nearly
absolutely free as anything can be.
Id.
79. Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 779 (Okla. 1989).
80. Id. at 768-69. In this case, the public condemnation before the Church of Christ
congregation was made all the more disgraceful for the plaintiff by the fact that the congre-
gation comprised about five percent of the town's population. Id. at 768.
81. Id. at 775 ("[W]e hold that, on the record of this case, the Elders' prewithdrawal
acts are shielded from scrutiny by secular judicature. The Parishioner could not possibly
recover [for the Elders' religious actions].").
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for her errant behavior.82 A church may not, however, invoke the Free
Exercise Clause as protection against liability for denying its members
other constitutional rights.83
C. The Free Exercise Defense and Intangible Damages
Civil remedies are typically unavailable to plaintiffs alleging that a re-
ligious group's tortious conduct has caused them some intangible or emo-
tional harm.84 In fact, the Ninth Circuit held, "A religious organization
has a defense of constitutional privilege to claims that it has caused intan-
gible harms-in most, if not all, circumstances."85 Other courts have ap-
plied this doctrine to preclude civil liability, especially where the allegedly
tortious conduct has produced little or no tangible, physical harm.86
The rationale underlying this approach is best described in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, in which the Supreme Court, rejecting criminal liability for
intangible harm to society, explained that "[tihe essential characteristic of
[free exercise] liberties is, that under their shield many types of life, char-
acter, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed. No-
where is this shield more necessary than in our own country for a people
composed of many races and of many creeds."87 In other words, in order
to live in a religiously diverse society, citizens must develop thicker hides,
82. Id. ("By voluntarily uniting with the church, [the parishioner] impliedly consented
to submitting to its form of religious government.").
83. Id. ("[The parishioner] did not.., consent to relinquishing a right which the civil
law guarantees her as its constitutionally protected value."); see also Turner v. Unification
Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 372 (D.R.I. 1978) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does
not immunize defendant Unification Church from parishioner's causes of action alleging
involuntary servitude and intentional tortious activity), affd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979).
"The Unification Church cannot seek the protection of one constitutional amendment
while it allegedly deprives citizens the protection of other constitutional guarantees." Tur-
ner, 473 F. Supp. at 372.
84. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940); Paul v. Watchtower
Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 1987); Murphy v. I.S.K. Con. of
New England, 571 N.E.2d 340, 348 (Mass. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991); Pleasant
Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct.
1003 (2009).
85. Paul, 819 F.2d at 883 (footnote omitted) ("As the United States Supreme Court
has observed, '[t]he values underlying these two provisions [of the First Amendment] relat-
ing to religion have been zealously protected, sometimes even at the expense of others
interests.'" (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972))).
86. See, e.g., Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 348 ("Intangible or emotional harms cannot ordi-
narily serve as a basis for maintaining a tort cause of action against a church for its prac-
tices-or against its members." (quoting Paul, 819 F.2d at 883)); Pleasant Glade Assembly of
God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 13 ("Because providing a remedy for the very real, but
religiously motivated emotional distress in this case would require us to take sides in what
is essentially a religious controversy, we cannot resolve that dispute.").
87. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310.
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tolerating the expression of diverse beliefs with which even the majority
may not agree.88 If the law may be used as a weapon to punish persons
for their idiosyncratic beliefs, it would effectively create an establishment
of those religions that the majority can agree to tolerate, contravening the
most basic constitutional principles.89
Courts are even less inclined to permit recovery for intangible harms
because of the plaintiff's presumed consent to the conduct by member-
ship in the religious organization.9" For instance, in Laura Schubert's
case, the Texas Supreme Court applied the laissez-faire principle of judi-
cial deference to religious groups' internal governance to a minor child's
claim of tortious physical abuse.91
In fact, even outside the religious context, common law courts have
long been reluctant to compensate mental anguish as an injury in itself,
rather than as parasitically attached to some tangible damage." It was
88. See Paul, 819 F.2d at 883 ("Without society's tolerance of offenses to sensibility,
the protection of religious differences mandated by the [F]irst [A]mendment would be
meaningless."). But see GuIDo CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW:
PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 57 (1985). Professor Calabresi
asserts:
[Tort law] highlights the ugly side of the melting pot. It declares in profoundly practi-
cal terms ... that newcomers, new believers, new religions may indeed have equality
in this land, but only if they give up those tenets of their faith that do not fit; ones that
are somehow not of the 'banquet' variety.
Id.
89. See Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional In-
fliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 579, 581 (1993) ("Through its remedial and substantive aspects, [lIED]
threatens both defendants right of religious freedom and society's important interest in
tolerating different religious views.").
90. See Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 774 (Okla. 1989);
Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 13. As Chief Justice Jefferson
explained in his dissenting opinion:
Nevertheless, the Court treats church membership as an across the board buffer to
tort liability. The problems with this approach are obvious. It is impossible to apply
the Court's standard in the absence of factual development or determination in the
trial court. We are in no position to decide that the ordeal to which Schubert was
subjected was so "expected" and "accepted by those in the church" as to overcome
Schubert's vehement denial of consent at the time of the incidents.
Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 20 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
91. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 10 ("[A]lthough
Laura's secular injury claims might theoretically be tried without mentioning religion, the
imposition of tort liability for engaging in religious activity to which the church members
adhere would have an unconstitutional 'chilling effect' by compelling the church to aban-
don core principles of its religious beliefs.").
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 46 cmt. b (1965) ("Because of the fear of
fictitious or trivial claims, distrust of the proof offered, and the difficulty of setting up any
satisfactory boundaries to liability, the law has been slow to afford independent protection
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not until the twentieth century that the American Law Institute added
IIED to the Restatement of Torts as an independent cause of action.93
The Second Restatement of Torts defines IIED as "extreme and outra-
geous conduct intentionally or recklessly caus[ing] severe emotional dis-
tress to another."94 Though courts have been slow to accept IIED as an
independent tort, they are generally in agreement as to what conduct
meets this definition.95 According to the official commentary to the Sec-
ond Restatement:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outra-
geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and ut-
terly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one
in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the com-
munity would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him
to exclaim, "Outrageous!"96
Courts, however, have rarely permitted plaintiffs to recover for IIED
where the allegedly outrageous conduct was religious in nature.
97
to the interest in freedom from emotional distress standing alone."); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 12, at 54-55 (5th ed. 1984) ("Mental pain or anxi-
ety,' said Lord Wensleydale in a famous English case, 'the law cannot value, and does not
pretend to redress, when the unlawful act causes that alone.'). But see Wilkinson v.
Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57, 58-59 (permitting recovery for the functional equivalent of
intentional infliction of emotional distress for possibly the first time in common law). The
English court held:
[The rule that] illness through mental shock is a too remote or unnatural consequence
of an [injury] to entitle the plaintiff to recover in a case where damage is a necessary
part of the cause of action ... [cannot] be adopted as a general application without
results which it would be difficult or impossible to defend.
Id. at 59-60.
93. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46(1) (1965).
95. See id. cmt. c ("The law is still in a stage of development, and the ultimate limits of
this tort are not yet determined.").
96. Id. cmt. d ("The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.... There is no occasion for the
law to intervene in every case where some one's feelings are hurt.").
97. See generally, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 819 F.2d 875
(9th Cir. 1987); Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 762
P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989); Glass v. First United Pentecostal
Church, 676 So. 2d 724 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Murphy v. I.S.K. Con. of New England, 571
N.E.2d 340 (Mass. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991); Olson v. First Church of Naza-
rene, 661 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unifica-
tion of World Christianity, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Guinn v. Church of
Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989); Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schu-
bert, 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1003 (2009); In re Pleasant Glade
Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998), rev'd, 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.
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But, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Cantwell, nothing in the law
immunizes religious groups from liability for either illegal or tortious con-
duct.98 Even the cherished principle of religious freedom must, at times,
be inconvenienced for the sake of protecting the health, safety, and gen-
eral welfare of the public.9 9 In weighing the interests of society against
those of religious freedom itself, courts must take care to preserve pure
religious belief, internal church discipline, and the special relationship be-
tween churches and their parishioners. Yet, courts must remember that
while "[t]he First Amendment guards religious liberty[,] it does not sanc-
tion intentional abuse in religion's name." 10
0
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS: WHY PERPETRATORS OF RELIGIOUSLY
MOTIVATED VIOLENCE CAN No LONGER HIDE
BEHIND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Traditional Approach: Judicial Tolerance of Abuse
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to impose liability for a pa-
rishioner's emotional or intangible harms where the allegedly wrongful
conduct was religiously motivated. 10 1 While many courts have, for that
reason, denied claims against religious organizations for IIED, several
states have effectively barred these claims altogether.102
The traditional approach, however, is fundamentally flawed. The dis-
missal of claims for emotional damages of victims of religiously motivated
violence, particularly women and children members of minority reli-
2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1003 (2009). But see generally, e.g., Madsen v. Erwin, 481
N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985); Jones ex rel. Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1992); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
98. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) ("Nothing we have said is in-
tended even remotely to imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impu-
nity, commit frauds upon the public.").
99. Id. at 306-07.
100. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 13 (Jefferson, C.J.,
dissenting).
101. See, e.g., Paul, 819 F.2d at 883.
102. See, e.g., id.; Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 354; Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v.
Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 13. Chief Justice Jefferson of the Texas Supreme Court explained:
The Court today essentially bars all recovery for mental anguish damages stemming
from allegedly religiously motivated, intentional invasions of bodily integrity commit-
ted against members of a religious group. This overly broad holding not only conflicts
with well-settled legal and constitutional principles, it will also prove to be dangerous
in practice. Texas courts have been and will continue to be confronted with cases in
which a congregant suffers physical or psychological injury as a result of violent or
unlawful, but religiously sanctioned, acts.
Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 22 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
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gions, 103 contravenes fundamental principles of tort law aimed at protect-
ing society's weakest members from unchecked abuse. 10 4 Proponents of
limiting recovery for parishioners' intangible damages argue that this ap-
proach benefits minority religions by immunizing them against judgment
according to standards of reasonableness defined by an intolerant major-
ity.10 5 But proponents of the traditional approach fail to consider the
impact of this policy on the victims of violent religious conduct. Where
the religiously motivated conduct at issue is violent, the traditional appli-
cation of the free exercise defense protects those who abuse vulnerable
women and children in the name of religion at the expense of the abused.
While I do not advocate complete abandonment of judicial tradition in
this area of the law, I do propose that courts permit recovery for purely
emotional or intangible damages in cases where the plaintiff is a parish-
ioner victim of religiously motivated violence. This approach preserves
the traditional considerations afforded to religious groups, particularly
unpopular religious minorities, while still providing legal protection for
the victims of violent conduct that, regardless of motivation, cannot be
tolerated in a civilized society. The ideals of religious freedom and plu-
rality inherent in the First Amendment must be safeguarded, but not at
the expense of the safety and health of the individual believers to whom
the liberty was given.
103. See DAVID E. GUINN, FAITH ON TRIAL: COMMUNITIES OF FAITH, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE THEORY OF DEEP DIVERSITY 175 (2002) (noting that the United
States' growing number of religious minorities are often members of ethnic minorities as
well); Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The
Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1996) ("[V]ictims and potential victims
in such circumstances have no hope of relief in the future.").
104. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism:
The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1996) (arguing against culturally
individualized justice, which has been used by immigrants and members of cultural and
religious minorities to evade liability for violent conduct that would be tolerable in the
defendant's native country or culture, but is illegal in the United States). Professor Cole-
man describes the impact of culturally individualized justice:
What happens to the victims-almost always minority women and children-when
multiculturalism and individualized justice are advanced by dispositive cultural evi-
dence? The answer, both in theory and in practice, is stark: They are denied the pro-
tection of the criminal laws because their assailants generally go free, either
immediately or within a relatively brief period of time.
Id.
105. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct. Intentional Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 579, 586 (1993) ("[I]t is a danger because it may extend too ready an invitation for
law to intrude in many places where it should not go, and may allow majoritarianism to
ride roughshod over unpopular or minority rights and beliefs, the protection of which is an
important societal value.").
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B. Intangible Harms as Parasitic Damages
The majority approach to resolution of tort claims for emotional dam-
ages caused by religious conduct is best articulated in a frequently cited
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Paul v. Watchtower Bi-
ble.1" 6 In that case, a Jehovah's Witness sued her church for, inter alia,
outrageous conduct because it encouraged its members to shun her after
she was disfellowshipped 1°7 from the congregation.1 °8 Upholding sum-
mary judgment for the church, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a state's
decision to designate a certain behavior as criminal or tortious is not dis-
positive of whether state interference with the behavior in a religious con-
text violates free exercise rights.1 °9 According to the court, only religious
behavior that poses a direct "threat to the peace, safety, or morality of
the community,"11 0 or that directly harms individuals,1 such as an as-
sault or battery,"' warrants governmental intervention over the free ex-
ercise defense. 3 The court concluded that shunning former members
did not constitute any such threat or harm and, thus, Janice Paul's claim
could not override the church's free exercise rights. 1 4
In cases involving similarly passive, non-violent behavior in which the
parishioner-plaintiffs were only indirectly harmed, courts have consist-
ently referred to the rule in Paul when denying plaintiffs recovery for
106. See Paul, 819 F.2d at 883 ("Although we recognize that the harms suffered by
[plaintiff] are real and not insubstantial, permitting her to recover for intangible or emo-
tional injuries would unconstitutionally restrict the Jehovah's Witnesses free exercise of
religion.").
107. Id. (defining "disfellowshiped" Jehovah's Witnesses as former congregants "who
have been excommunicated from the church"). The court explained:
One consequence of disfellowship is "shunning," a form of ostracism. Members of the
Jehovah's Witness community are prohibited-under threat of their own disfellowship-
from having any contact with disfellowshipped persons and may not even greet them.
Family members who do not live in the same house may conduct necessary family
business with disfellowshipped relatives but may not communicate with them on any
other subject.
Id. at 876-77.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 881 n.5.
110. Id. at 883 ("We find the practice of shunning not to constitute a sufficient threat
to the peace, safety, or morality of the community as to warrant state intervention.").
111. Paul, 819 F.2d at 878 ("The state is legitimately concerned with [shunning's] reg-
ulation only to the extent that individuals are directly harmed.").
112. Id. at 883 ("The harms suffered by [plaintiff] as a result of her shunning by the
Jehovah's Witnesses are clearly not the type that would justify the imposition of tort liabil-
ity for religious conduct. No physical assault or battery occurred.").
113. Id.
114. Id.
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their emotional suffering.115 This approach reflects an historical favoring
of free exercise interests over many others, even those of significant so-
cial importance. 116 For instance, Marian Guinn was humiliated when the
leaders of her Church of Christ congregation publicly branded her a for-
nicator before the church's members, "approximately five percent of the
town's population."'1 7 Yet, despite Marian's undeniable interests in pri-
vacy and an untarnished reputation, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma de-
nied recovery for her intangible damages because doing so would unduly
burden the church's right to condemn her religiously errant extra-marital
affair." 8
Comparing Marian Guinn's case with Janice Paul's, the most notable
distinction lies in the nature of the church conduct. The Jehovah's Wit-
nesses turned their backs on Janice, both figuratively and literally," 9 but
they did not affirmatively act to punish her by impugning her dignity, as
in Marian's case. 2 ' Yet, despite the factual difference, neither woman
was permitted to recover for her emotional injuries.' 2 1 The Paul court
justified its decision, stating that "although shunning is intentional, the
activity is not malum in se. The state is legitimately concerned with its
regulation only to the extent that individuals are directly harmed."' 22
Similarly, the Guinn court explained:
In testing the constitutionality of the court's action against the Elders
and the jury's verdict in Parishioner's favor, the proper inquiry is
whether, on the record, the Elders' decision to discipline Parishioner
constituted such a threat to the public safety, peace or order that it
justified the state trial court's decision to pursue the compelling in-
115. E.g., Glass v. First United Pentecostal Church, 676 So. 2d 724, 733 (La. Ct. App.
1996); Murphy v. I.S.K. Con. of New England, 571 N.E.2d 340, 348 (Mass. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991); Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 773
(Okla. 1989); Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1003 (2009); Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 400 (Tex. 2007),
reh'g denied (Sept. 28, 2007).
116. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) ("The values underlying [the Free
Exercise Clause] have been zealously protected, sometimes even at the expense of other
interests of admittedly high social importance.").
117. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 768.
118. Id. at 774-75 (remanding with instructions to render judgment against Guinn for
the portion of her claim based on the church's conduct prior to her resignation from the
congregation).
119. Paul, 819 F.2d at 876-77.
120. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 768.
121. Paul, 819 F.2d at 883; Guinn, 775 P.2d at 775.
122. Paul, 819 F.2d at 878.
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terest of providing its citizens with a means of vindicating their rights
conferred by tort law.123
Thus, it appears both courts' decisions rested on the fact that the alleg-
edly tortious conduct was not a threat to public peace or safety. 124 Even
where, as in Guinn, the church conduct was not merely passive, but rather
an affirmative attempt to injure the plaintiff's interests, the non-violent
nature of the conduct is what ultimately immunized it from tort
liability.1
25
Certainly, both Guinn and Paul were injured, albeit intangibly, by the
respective conduct of their churches. In both cases, had the women been
subjected to the exact same conduct committed for secular purposes by
persons not affiliated with the churches, they would likely recover for
their emotional injuries.1 26 But courts acknowledge the special right of
religious institutions to the unfettered freedom to practice their beliefs,
especially with respect to their own members. 127 As the Guinn court
reasoned:
If members of religious organizations could freely pursue their doc-
trinal grievances in civil courts, or legislatures could pass laws to in-
hibit or enhance religious activities, ecclesiastical liberty would be
subjected to governmental interference and the "unmolested and un-
obstructed" development of opinion and belief which the First
Amendment shield was designed to foster could be secularly
undermined.1 28
Unfortunately, in many cases, judicial concern for religious organiza-
tions' free exercise rights fails to secure the interests of parishioners who
have suffered emotional injuries as a result of the violent, yet religiously
123. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 773.
124. Paul, 819 F.2d at 878; Guinn, 775 P.2d at 773.
125. See Guinn, 775 P.2d at 773.
126. See Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 762
P.2d 46, 61 (Cal. 1988) (suggesting that because a nonreligious organization engaged in the
same fraudulent conduct as the defendant-religious organization would be held legally lia-
ble for its conduct, the defendant should not be excused from liability merely because of its
religious affiliation), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
127. Paul, 819 F.2d at 883 ("Intangible or emotional harms cannot ordinarily serve as
a basis for maintaining a tort cause of action against a church for its practices-or against its
members."); Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. 2008)
(concluding that "the imposition of tort liability for engaging in religious activity to which
the church members adhere would have an unconstitutional 'chilling effect' by compelling
the church to abandon core principles"), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1003 (2009).
128. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 772.
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motivated conduct of their churches.1 29 Violence need not always pro-
duce tangible, physical injury. 3 Recall Laura's case, in which the con-
gregation forcibly restrained her for hours against her aggressive
resistance, causing her to suffer post-traumatic stress disorder but only
minor scrapes and bruises.13 1 Because cases like Laura's exist, the prohi-
bition on recovery for emotional damages in these scenarios leaves vic-
tims of religious violence without a judicial remedy. Consequently, under
the current regime, courts must make a zero-sum choice between two
competing interests: protecting the free exercise rights of religious groups
and defending the health and safety of the faithful.
The approach barring claims for emotional damages in religious con-
duct cases purports to serve another admittedly laudable objective: to
protect religious institutions from arbitrary and capricious imposition of
liability for damages that are notoriously difficult to prove or measure.
132
As one legal scholar puts it, "[T]he adjudication of these ... claims em-
broils courts in forbidden inquiries. These inquiries have few boundaries
or even guidelines and concern the verity, social value, and acceptability
of particular religious beliefs. This is a major, not a minor, flaw."' 3 3 Par-
ticularly where the underlying religious beliefs are unusual or belong to
an unfamiliar religious minority, free exercise may be threatened by po-
tentially unlimited liability for intangible damages.'
34
Nevertheless, assessing a dollar amount to emotional injury is not a
new concept, and common law courts have been doing so since at least
the nineteenth century.' 35 Indeed, "mental suffering is scarcely more dif-
ficult of proof, and certainly no harder to estimate in terms of money,
129. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
10 (2005).
130. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 17 (Jefferson, C.J.,
dissenting) ("This is common sense: many experiences including some sexual assaults and
certain forms of torture are extremely traumatic yet result in no serious physical injury.");
Wilson v. Lund, 491 P.2d 1287, 1291 (Wash. 1971) ("'Intangible-emotional' injuries can and
do constitute real and significant harms."); 20 William V. Dorsaneo III, Texas Litigation
Guide § 331.06 (2009) ("Mental suffering caused by a false imprisonment, including humili-
ation, shame, fright, and anguish, is also compensable, regardless of whether any physical
harm was inflicted on the plaintiff.").
131. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 4.
132. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 12, at 55 (5th
ed. 1984) (referring to intangible damages).
133. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 579, 584 (1993).
134. Id. at 586 (discussing the danger of permitting juries to calculate damages based
solely on "the degree of social undesirability of the defendant's conduct").
135. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 12, at 55 (5th ed.
1984); see also Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57, 58 (upholding a cause of action
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than the physical pain of a broken leg, which never has been denied com-
pensation. '"136 To compensate victims of physical injury while denying
recovery in cases involving intangible harms denies a long history of ac-
ceptance of the reality of emotional suffering.
137
Further, where the religiously motivated conduct in question is violent,
choosing the right of the religious organization to free exercise over the
right of the victim to physical and emotional integrity undermines several
fundamental goals of tort law. 138 Excusing violent conduct based on the
defendant's argument that "my religion made me do it" sends a message
to minority religious communities that violence is tolerable so long as it is
committed under the guise of piety.139 Pursuant to this message, abusers
learn that they may abuse with impunity, while the abused conclude that
they are entitled to no legal protection against violence in their
communities.
140
While proponents of the traditional approach contend that the law's
understanding of religious conduct need not automatically require toler-
ance of it,14 ' tolerance is precisely the result where minority religious
communities are led to believe that certain forms of conduct are permissi-
brought by a woman who suffered severe emotional distress after the defendant, intending
a practical joke, told her that her husband had been critically injured in an accident).
136. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 12, at 55 (5th ed.
1984).
137. See id.
138. See id. § 1, at 6. Prosser and Keeton explain:
[T]o strike some reasonable balance between the plaintiff's claim to protection against
damage and the defendant's claim to freedom of action for defendant's own ends, and
those of society, occupies a very large part of the tort opinions.... Sometimes it must
range rather far afield, and look primarily to the social consequences which will
follow.
Id.
139. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multicultural-
ism: The Liberals' Dilemma 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1138 (1996) (describing how courts'
acceptance of the cultural defense in criminal law convinces women in cultural minority
communities that they are unworthy of the same legal protections as European-American
women). Coleman argues:
This different standard may defeat the deterrent effect of the law, and it may become
precedent, both for future cases with similar facts, and for the broader position that
race-or national origin-based applications of the criminal law are appropriate. Thus,
the use of cultural defenses is anathema to another fundamental goal of the progres-
sive agenda, namely the expansion of legal protections for some of the least powerful
members of American society: women and children.
Id. at 1095.
140. See id.
141. CATHARINE COOKSON, REGULATING RELIGION: THE COURTS AND THE FREE
EXERCISE CLAUSE 188 (2001).
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ble.' 4 2 Failure to hold religious actors liable for their tortious acts does
little to deter other actors from engaging in similar conduct. 143 Tort law is
designed to deter unreasonable conduct, such as violence and other intru-
sions upon a person's physical and mental security, by threatening actors
with the possibility of liability for their conduct.144 To condone unreason-
able conduct because of its religious nature is counterproductive to this
end.
In addition, where the threat of liability is removed for some actors but
not others, the law creates a system of individualized justice that is incon-
sistent with American legal values. 145 As one scholar, arguing in the
criminal context, notes, "To insist that people have a constitutional right
to exemptions from the criminal law for religiously motivated behavior
would render ineffectual the criminal law and produce a kind of anar-
chy.' 46 Not only is this result antagonistic to the constitutional com-
mand that the laws apply equally to all persons, 47 but it harms society as
a whole by arbitrarily exempting some actors from liability for conduct
that the broader community has deemed intolerable or undesirable. 148
Moreover, courts have established that when the offense is a positive act,
142. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multicultural-
ism: The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1138 (1996) (describing the impact
upon Chinese-American women of a New York case in which a Chinese-American man
received only five years of probation for bludgeoning his wife to death because he argued
that Chinese custom permits men to punish their wives for unfaithfulness in this manner).
One battered Chinese woman told a worker at the New York Asian Women's Center,
"Even thinking about that case makes me afraid. My husband told me: 'If this is the
kind of sentence you get for killing your wife, I could do anything to you. I have the
money for a good attorney."'
Id.
143. See id. at 1136. Professor Coleman explains:
Failure to punish a defendant for his intentionally criminal act on the basis of an ex-
pert's testimony that "his culture made him do it" does little to deter others in the
defendant's circumstances from committing the same act; or to deter the defendant
himself from repeating his offense; or to assure the victims and potential victims of
such criminal conduct that society is willing to protect them; or to punish the defen-
dant for the harm created by his act.
Id.
144. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 1, at 6 (5th ed.
1984).
145. See id.; Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multicul-
turalism: The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1135-36 (1996).
146. BErE NOVIT EVANS, INTERPRETING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION: THE
CONSTTUTION AND AMERICAN PLURALISM 185 (1997) (emphasis in original).
147. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multicultural-
ism: The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1135-36 (1996).
148. See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF
LAW 48 (2005).
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committed knowingly and intentionally, it is dangerous to permit the ac-
tor to escape punishment for his conduct simply because his religious be-
liefs motivated the affirmative disregard for the law.'4 9 For this reason,
"the government's obligation is to persist in choosing the public good
over all other concerns.' 150
It cannot be denied, however, that religion supports the public good in
many ways. 1 5 ' As George Washington emphasized in his storied farewell
address, "[A]mong many others, religion can be considered a great social
good in supporting a strong, positive moral environment through the cre-
ation of a moral citizenry.' 15a And, as one scholar notes, "Religious be-
liefs and speech are also a crucial source of critique of the state, and at
their best bring the human drive to power into perspective." '153 But relig-
ion is no casual bystander in a global history of strife and violence,' 5' and
to completely disregard the role of religion in the pain and suffering of
citizen-parishioners is to ignore both reason and common sense. Particu-
larly in minority religious communities, the risk of internal violence is
greatly magnified by secrecy and exclusivity.' 5 5 In these cases, where the
elements of bad conduct may be secularly judged for reasonableness
without implicating the religious beliefs underlying the act itself, the legal
system should not excuse violent behavior simply because it is religiously
motivated. 56
149. Id. at 67 (quoting State v. Barlow, 153 P.2d 647, 653 (Utah 1944), appeal dis-
missed for want of a substantial federal question, 324 U.S. 829 (1945), reh'g denied (Apr. 23,
1945)); see also In re Black, 283 P.2d 887, 904 (Utah 1955) ("However free the exercise of
religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country, passed with
reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly the subjects of punitive legisla-
tion." (emphasis in original)), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 923 (1955).
150. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
72 (2005).
151. Id. at 4.
152. DAVID E. GUINN, FAITH ON TRIAL: COMMUNITIES OF FAITH, THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT AND THE THEORY OF DEEP DIVERSITY 175 (2002).
153. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 4
(2005).
154. DAVID E. GUINN, FAITH ON TRIAL: COMMUNITIES OF FAITH, THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT AND THE THEORY OF DEEP DIVERSITY 174 (2002).
155. See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF
LAW 24 (2005) (describing conditions in a desert enclave that is home to members of the
secretive Fundamentalist Church of Latter-day Saints (FLDS)). In this community, "[t]he
complete disregard for state and federal law and the arrogation of the right to make and
enforce [the FLDS's] own law is about as anarchical as an organization can get." Id.
156. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2008) (Jef-
ferson, C.J., dissenting) ("This sweeping immunity is inconsistent with United States Su-
preme Court precedent and extends far beyond the protections our Constitution affords
religious conduct."), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1003 (2009); DAVID E. GUINN, FAITH ON
TRIAL: COMMUNITIES OF FAITH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE THEORY OF DEEP DI-
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The argument for across-the-board exemptions for religiously moti-
vated conduct suggests that, in the name of religious pluralism, the tre-
mendous advances in equal protection gained by minorities, and minority
women in particular, should be ignored. 57 After generations of formal
discrimination in the law, women have, in most areas, finally attained the
right to be secure against legally sanctioned violence and abuse. 158 How-
ever, because women and children are most often the victims of relig-
iously motivated violence, 59 courts must remember that taking a
permissive stance on religious violence endangers those individuals the
law and society have deemed especially worthy of protection.1 60
Children are also particularly vulnerable to religious violence when the
law is primarily concerned with protecting child abusers as religious enti-
ties. 161 Where the religious beliefs of those who violently abuse children
are permitted to justify the wrongdoing, the children are victimized
twice-once by their abusers and again by the legal system that should
have compensated them for their injuries.162 The state has a special obli-
gation to protect children, one that the Supreme Court has held cannot
be limited by free exercise concerns alone.163
VERSITY 170 (2002) ("[W]here this position has merit, the absoluteness of its formulation
precludes consideration of what can be rationally justified and argued.").
157. See Lama Abu-Odeh, Crimes of Honour and the Construction of Gender in Arab
Societies, in FEMINISM AND ISLAM: LEGAL AND LITERARY PERSPECTIVES 141, 146 (Mai
Yamani ed., 1996) (describing the efforts of Laure Mughayzil, a Lebanese lawyer, who has
argued that laws in Arab countries that exempt men from criminal liability for so-called
'honor killings,' in which men murder their wives or female relatives for their alleged un-
chaste conduct, reinforce a tribal mentality that is inconsistent with intellectual and social
development in the area of women's legal rights); Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individual-
izing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093,
1142 (1996).
158. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism:
The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1142 (1996).
159. Id. at 1095.
160. See id. at 1142.
161. See id. at 1143. Coleman warns:
In the name of rejecting cultural relativism in the law, child-victims of immigrant
crime (victims, essentially, of cultural pluralism) have been-and, if the cultural de-
fense continues to be accepted, will continue to be-left without protection by the
criminal law. This result serves neither the intent of deterrence nor that of retribution,
two principal penalogical purposes of the criminal law. The children are thus victims
twice, once physically, and then legally.
Id.; MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD vs. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 13
(2005).
162. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multicultural-
ism: The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1143 (1996).
163. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (upholding criminal prose-
cution of Jehovah's Witnesses employing child labor to distribute religious literature).
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A case in point: a splinter sect of the Mormon Church, the Fundamen-
talist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, commonly known as
the FLDS, has raised tremendous controversy in the western United
States and Canada for illegally practicing polygamy and promoting child
marriage. 164 Several former members have sued the FLDS for the forced
marriage and rape of minor children, allegedly committed pursuant to the
sect's core beliefs.165 For instance, Deborah Palmer was forced at only
age fifteen to marry a man nearly three times her age, who already had
five wives. 16 6 As his concubine, Deborah was reduced to chattel status in
the community and required to bear as many of her husband's children as
possible, lest her soul "burn for all eternity in Hell. '1 67 In these isolated
communities, the underage brides and their children frequently suffer
physical and sexual abuse,' 6' and they are further isolated by the secular
government's refusal to prosecute their abusers.1 69
Because the women and children victims of FLDS-sanctioned abuse
are often emotionally and psychologically traumatized by their exper-
iences, but not physically scarred, the law as it currently stands may not
provide an adequate remedy for those who manage to escape the sect and
sue for their injuries.' The law must protect freedom of religion, but
not at the expense of victims of religiously motivated violence. Where
this type of violence has purely intangible harms, it cannot be excused
simply because the physical violation left no visible marks. Abuse is
abuse, and the law must deter its commission against susceptible women
and children in order to protect society as a whole.
Another issue complicating claims involving religious conduct within
the congregation is that of consent. Does membership within a religious
organization automatically equate to consent to all religiously motivated
conduct? As courts are generally reluctant to closely scrutinize the rela-
"The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose ... the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death." Id.
164. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD Vs. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
21 (2005).
165. Id. at 22-23.
166. Id. at 23.
167. Id. (noting that, in the FLDS, a woman's "life's purpose is to assist the men in
reaching 'godhood,' which is attained if the man has many concubines").
168. Id. at 73.
169. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
73-74 (2005). In fact, in the neighboring cities of Colorado City, Arizona and Hildale,
Utah, the local law enforcement belong to the FLDS and routinely turn a blind eye to the
violence that occurs daily in those communities. Id. at 24.
170. Id. at 76 ("[I]t is the obligation of the legislators to determine what is in the best
interests of all the people-men, women, children, and society as a whole. And the debate
belongs in the legislature, not the courts.").
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tionship between churches and their congregants,' 7 ' they are equally
hesitant to resolve disputes involving the voluntariness of a congregant's
submission to a particular ritual or behavior.1 72 Thus, a growing number
of courts have simply concluded that consent to church rituals is implied
by voluntary membership in the religious group.
17 3
This approach, however, misapplies the established doctrine forbidding
judicial inquiry into matters of ecclesiastical government and internal dis-
cipline.17 ' As noted by the Supreme Court, the law should not intrude
upon purely internal matters of religious government,1 75 and voluntary
membership in a religious organization does imply consent to the internal
governance thereof.1 76 But voluntary membership does not imply con-
sent to the relinquishment of fundamental rights to physical and emo-
tional integrity.1 77 Just as a battered spouse is not presumed to consent to
physical or emotional violence by marrying or remaining married to the
abuser, 78 a religious adherent should not be presumed to consent to vio-
lence by joining the congregation.
171. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(arguing that church conduct involving only church members should be generally beyond
the purview of the courts).
172. See, e.g., Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., 535 F. Supp. 1125,
1144-45 (D. Mass. 1982). The district court held:
Although there may be ways in which a party could... [prove] that "forms of religious
organizations were created for the sole purpose of cloaking a secular enterprise with
the legal protection of a religion," ... a general inquiry into whether individual mem-
bers of a religion hold in good faith the belief they assert is not one of them.
Id.
173. E.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir.
1987); Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 777 (Okla. 1989); Pleasant
Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 12-13 (Tex. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S.Ct. 1003 (2009).
174. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
708-09 (1976).
175. Id. (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
176. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 777.
177. See Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 20 (Jefferson,
C.J., dissenting). As Chief Justice Jefferson contended:
[T]he Court treats church membership as an across the board buffer tort liability. The
problems with this approach are obvious ... we are in no position to decide that the
ordeal to which [the Plaintiff] was subjected was so "expected" and accepted by those
in the church as to overcome [the Plaintiffs] vehement denial of consent at the time of
the incidents.
Id. (citations omitted).
178. State v. Smith, 481 S.E.2d 747, 751 (W. Va. 1996). The court reiterated:
In the context of a claim of self-defense by a battered spouse, our Supreme Court has
explained: 'A woman whose husband has repeatedly subjected her to physical abuse
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A special problem arises where the plaintiff-parishioner is a child.
Some courts have extended the implied consent reasoning to cases in-
volving minor parishioners, reasoning that children impliedly consent to
religious conduct by church membership in the same way that adults
do.1 7 9 Courts generally respect a child's membership in a religious com-
munity, even if that membership is merely derivative of the parents'
membership.18 ° In the case of a child who belongs to her parent's church,
the child has not consented to any intrusive or violent religious conduct,
nor should she be permitted to do so, even if her parents did. Adoles-
cents are especially impressionable and susceptible to coercive conduct,
yet the law routinely fails to consider the rights of minors in religious
settings. 181 The particular vulnerability of children should, on the con-
trary, compel stricter oversight of religious conduct involving minors, and
courts must not continue to blithely dismiss the claims of child victims of
religious violence. 182
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Additional complications arise when plaintiffs seek redress for intangi-
ble harms via claims of IIED because the nature of the tort itself raises
does not, by choosing to maintain her family relationship with that husband and their
children, consent to or assume the risk of further abuse.'
Id.
179. E.g., Murphy v. I.S.K. Con. of New England, 571 N.E.2d 340, 349 (Mass. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991). The Massachusetts Supreme Court found:
[W]e are not persuaded that [plaintiff's] age alleviates the free exercise concerns
raised by the jury's evaluation of the defendant's religious beliefs. The fact that [plain-
tiff] was a minor when she was involved with the defendant may lessen the degree of
constitutional protection.... However, the nature of the challenge to the defendant's
beliefs.., embroils the court in an assessment of the propriety of those beliefs regard-
less of the age of the plaintiffs. This court may not engage in such deliberations.
Id.; see also Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 9-10.
180. See, e.g., Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 9-10.
181. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
12 (2005) ("[T]he law fails to consider adolescents' peculiar circumstances, [their] potential
susceptibility to coercion [and] the manner in which the legal system views adolescents'
impressionability and their ability to perceive (or to misperceive) government endorse-
ment of religion or of religiously influenced practices.").
182. See id. Hamilton explains:
Young people are at risk from religious adults and institutions in two ways: (1)
through the religious power to abuse the child; or (2) through their parents' religiously
motivated medical neglect or physical abuse. The suffering is often unimaginable, be-
cause the children lack the ability to protect themselves from death, permanent disa-
bility, or severe abuse-at the hands of those they have been taught are here on earth to
care for them.
Id.
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new concerns about the application of tort liability to cases involving re-
ligious conduct and parishioners. While claims for other forms of tortious
conduct do not raise free exercise concerns unless the damage caused is
purely intangible, IIED, by definition, produces intangible harms. The
dilemma courts face in IED cases is not only the intangibility of the dam-
ages, but also the fact that the conduct itself is only wrong if the actor
knew or should have known that it would produce extreme emotional
distress.183  Thus, claimants alleging IIED ask courts to determine
whether the defendant's religious conduct was wrong solely because it
was so outrageous that it injured the plaintiff's emotional well-being.
Because this type of claim necessarily embroils courts in dangerous in-
quiries regarding the reasonableness and acceptability of religious con-
duct, some scholars have argued in favor of definitively barring lIED
claims against religious actors, 184 and several jurisdictions have effec-
tively complied.185 Courts and scholars advocating this approach contend
that barring lIED claims will protect unpopular minority religions from
having their religious conduct judged by the majority under a reasonable-
ness standard. 186 In addition, they argue that adjudicating these claims
threatens freedom of belief itself because it punishes religious actors for
conduct that may be fundamental to their faiths.1 87
183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
184. E.g., Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 579, 583 (1993). Professor Hayden proposes:
I suggest the need for courts, utilizing traditional common law powers, to restrict the
scope of this particular common law tort in a manner that would result in greater
protection of religious freedom, broadly defined, and in the accordance of greater
weight to the societal interest in tolerating various religious beliefs. Such a restriction,
perhaps a radical one, is fully justified because the adjudication of these intentional
infliction claims embroils courts in forbidden inquiries.
Id. at 583-84.
185. E.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir.
1987); Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 777 (Okla. 1989); Pleasant
Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct.
1003 (2009).
186. E.g., Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 579, 586 (1993). Hayden explains:
There is no better example of the danger come to fruition than when a person sues
another alleging that religiously motivated conduct forms the basis of a claim for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. In such a case, the plaintiff urges the court to
find that the particular religiously motivated conduct is extreme and outrageous, ut-
terly intolerable in a civilized society, and that it has caused some intangible harm for
which the defendant should pay.
187. Id. at 581.
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By definition, the injury caused by IIED is intangible (extreme emo-
tional distress)' 8 8 and, therefore, difficult to quantify. And, as noted by
opponents of IIED's application to cases involving religious conduct, the
damages assessed are often a function of the degree to which the jury
feels the defendant's conduct is extreme and outrageous.1 89 Conse-
quently, the amount of damages rests upon the jury's evaluation of the
legitimacy and reasonableness of the defendant's religious beliefs,
thereby inviting the majority to suppress the unpopular beliefs of the
minority.1 90
In claims for IIED, which requires that the conduct be "outrageous...
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community, '191 critics of imposing
liability caution that juries might label a panoply of unpopular religious
practices sufficiently "outrageous" and "intolerable" to merit plaintiffs'
recovery. 92 Indeed, as Justice O'Connor wrote in her concurring opinion
in Employment Division v. Smith:
[T]he First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of
those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and
may be viewed with hostility. The history of our free exercise doc-
trine amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had
on unpopular or emerging religious groups such as the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Amish.193
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1) (1965) ("One who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it,
for such bodily harm." (emphasis added)).
189. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 579, 586 (1993) ("Fixing the amount of such damages is left largely to the discre-
tion of the jury, which awards damages on the basis of its sense of the degree of social
undesirability of the defendant's conduct and of the severity of the harm to the particular
plaintiff.").
190. Id. at 582.
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
192. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct. Intentional Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 Wm. & MARY
L. REV. 579, 580 (1993); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). In
Cantwell, the Supreme Court asserted:
[O]ne man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own
point of view, the pleader ... resorts to exaggeration, to vilification ... and even to
false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained ... that.., in spite of the
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310.
193. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,902 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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One scholar even contends that tort law and free exercise are "diametri-
cally opposed," as "[t]he former represents the enforcement of communi-
tarian intolerance of antisocial acts; the latter represents the protection of
unpopular, even antisocial, views and practices from the majority's ten-
dency to want to squelch them."194
But barring IIED claims involving religious conduct fundamentally
mischaracterizes the traditional relationship between religious pluralism
and the law in the United States.195 Within a breath of securing the right
to free exercise of religion, the drafters of the Bill of Rights ensured that
the law shall not establish any religion as entitled to greater protection
than another. 196 It follows that the law cannot prefer religious conduct to
secular conduct either. Thus, while the law must tolerate diverse beliefs
and practices, it cannot excuse antisocial behavior simply because it is
religiously motivated, while punishing similar behavior because it is
secular.
The law should intervene to prevent a bigoted majority from unfairly
punishing unpopular religious conduct, but it must also recognize that
some conduct is unpopular for good reason.197 In cases involving ex-
tremely antisocial behavior, courts have unapologetically sanctioned di-
rect burdens on free exercise and have repeatedly pledged to further
restrict any religious conduct that is so outrageous that it threatens the
health, safety, or general welfare of society at large. 198 Unfortunately,
the line distinguishing legally acceptable religious behavior from that
194. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 579, 597-98 (1993); see also GUIDo CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES,
AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 47 (1985) ("In a
sense, the court answered Pilate's celebrated question 'What is truth?' with a facile reply,
'A popularity contest."').
195. See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE
LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 54 (1985) (analyzing the historical import
of the Establishment Clause as applied to tort law).
196. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1 ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion ... ").
197. See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE
LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 60 (1985) (explaining the need for tort
laws to reject personal idiosyncrasies as evidence of reasonableness when evaluating con-
duct). To permit "[t]his would mean individuals would be able to accept-'free of
charge'-gifts of the evil deity when the society as a whole would rather have rejected."
Id. Regardless, "beliefs, however unorthodox in their unorthodoxality are part of what
constitutes reasonable prudence." Id. at 52.
198. See generally, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Hill v. State, 88 So. 2d 880
(Ala. Ct. App. 1956), cert. denied, 88 So. 2d 887 (Ala. 1956).
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which is beyond the pale is elusory at best.1 99 As a result, courts have
often shied away from deciding these tough cases.200
Striking a balance between the defendant's right to act and the plain-
tiff's right to protection against injury is among the principle aims of tort
law.20' This balancing act requires looking beyond the defendant's state
of mind or motivations, even when perfectly reasonable from the per-
spective of anyone in the defendant's position.20 2 It may be difficult for
courts to entrust juries with the task of evaluating the reasonableness of
faith,20 3 so some other factor must guide them in determining whether
the conduct itself is intolerable, despite its motivations. As Prosser and
Keeton assert, "[The law] may consider that the actor's behavior, al-
though entirely reasonable in itself ... has created a risk or has resulted
in harm to neighbors which is so far unreasonable that the actor should
nevertheless pay for the harm done., 204 In these difficult cases, where
religiously motivated conduct has caused a parishioner some intangible
harm, the deciding factor for liability should be the nature of the conduct
itself, rather than the underlying motivation. While nonviolent religious
conduct rarely poses such a threat to the public welfare that the state may
have an interest in curtailing it, violent conduct simply cannot be excused
under the guise of genuine religious inspiration.
199. See Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 579, 580 (1993) ("[lIED's] substantive standards are ill defined, requiring
the trier of fact in each case to render an ad hoc judgment about the outrageousness of the
particular defendant's particular conduct.").
200. E.g., Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1003 (2009).
201. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 1, at 6 (5th ed.
1984).
202. Id.
203. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 579, 598 (1993). Hayden explains:
Tort law's open texture, its ability to respond to and reflect changing social mores and
allow for the ad hoc condemnation of conduct that strikes a jury as socially undesir-
able, is both boon and danger in a democracy. It is a boon because it prevents doctri-
nal moribundity and stagnation and forestalls the widening of any gap between
communitarian notions of right and wrong and the legal standards that both enforce
and influence those notions. Yet it is a danger because it may extend too ready an
invitation for law to intrude into places where it should not go, and may allow majori-
tarianism to ride roughshod over unpopular or minority rights and beliefs, the protec-
tion of which is an important societal value.
Id. at 586.
204. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 1, at 6 (5th ed.
1984).
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D. A Proposal
In actions against religious organizations, courts should permit parish-
ioners to recover for their intangible damages where the underlying relig-
iously motivated conduct was violent in nature. By permitting this type
of recovery, the law may better protect members of religious communi-
ties who are victims of abuse perpetrated by the very persons and institu-
tions upon which they rely for spiritual guidance and guardianship.
Particularly where the parties are members of minority religions, courts
have an obligation to defend not only the interests of the minority faith
itself, but also its adherents. The well-intentioned approach of several
jurisdictions, essentially barring a cause of action for IIED in religious
conduct cases in order to preserve religious pluralism,20 5 incorrectly ap
plies First Amendment free exercise jurisprudence at the expense of
America's faithful.
Accordingly, my proposal aims to correct an unintended oversight in
the traditional approach to resolving these claims. Sometimes violence
does not result in the kind of physical, tangible injury courts consistently
deem worthy of civil compensation, even over free exercise objections.20 6
For instance, Laura Schubert's physical injuries were negligible after she
was forcibly restrained and treated for demonic possession against her
will.20 7 And in the FLDS case, young girls were forced to marry much
older men and repeatedly raped in order to bear those men as many chil-
dren as possible. 2°8 After years of systematic, community-sanctioned mo-
lestation, the only scars these girls often bore were psychological.20 9
Courts must tailor their approach to the free exercise defense in light of
the fact that violence can and does produce intangible injury independent
205. See generally, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 819 F.2d 875
(9th Cir. 1987); Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 762
P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989); Glass v. First United Pentecostal
Church, 676 So. 2d 724 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Murphy v. I.S.K. Con. of New England, 571
N.E.2d 340 (Mass. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991); Olson v. First Church of Naza-
rene, 661 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unifica-
tion of World Christianity, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Guinn v. Church of
Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989); Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schu-
bert, 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1003 (2009); In re Pleasant Glade
Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998), rev'd, 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1003 (2009).
206. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 18 (Jefferson, C.J.,
dissenting); Wilson v. Lund, 491 P.2d 1287, 1291 (Wash. 1971) ("'[I]ntangible-emotional'
injuries can and do constitute real and significant harms.").
207. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 4-5.
208. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
73 (2005).
209. Id. at 73-74.
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of physical harm and with due regard for the consequences of permitting
conduct that would, in a secular context, "[exceed] all bounds [of de-
cency] usually tolerated by a decent society, [and be] of a nature which is
especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress., 211
Even more compelling is the fact that both Laura and the young girls
victimized by the FLDS were children when they were abused,211 incapa-
ble of consenting to the abusive religious conduct courts have repeatedly
sanctioned.212 Because courts have often permitted religious violence
based on the premise that membership in a religious organization neces-
sarily implies consent to generally accepted religious practices, 213 it is es-
pecially important for courts to consider the impact of this interpretation
of the law on children. The law, as applied, fails to provide for the "pecu-
liar circumstances" of children, particularly their "potential susceptibility
to coercion., 214 A child cannot consent to religious abuse, even if she
belongs to her parents' church, willingly participates in church rituals, and
claims to adhere to the church's beliefs, as a child is simply too vulnerable
and impressionable to make informed choices about whether to submit to
psychologically troubling rituals. This factor is yet another oversight of
the prevailing approach that could be remedied by the religious violence
exception I advocate.
While those who champion the traditional approach warn that permit-
ting recovery in these cases invites judges and juries to penalize minority
beliefs and traditions based on their perceived "social undesirability, "215
an exception for conduct that is truly heinous would not unduly burden
religious pluralism. As one scholar puts it, "The First Amendment was
210. Molko, 762 P.2d at 63.
211. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 3; MARCI A. HAMIL-
TON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAw 22 (2005).
212. See ROGER J. R. LEVESQUE, NOT By FAITH ALONE RELIGION, LAw, AND ADO-
LESCENCE 126 (2002). Levesque explains:
The rule that emerges, then, supports the view that when a religious community seeks
protection, the Court will protect the religious community's interest in being left alone
but will not offer it affirmative assistance. Where the rights and needs of adolescents
fit into these patterns remains to be determined, in these cases, the potential individ-
ual interests of adolescents were not separated from the conflict among the parents,
the communities, and the state. In fact ... we do not know much about what the
'children' wanted, even more important, the [Court] did not require that we know
their preferences.
Id.
213. E.g., Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 15.
214. ROGER J. R. LEVESQUE, NOT By FAITH ALONE RELIGION, LAw, AND ADOLES-
CENCE 154 (2002).
215. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 579, 586 (1993).
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not crafted to protect conduct that harms others, even if the actor is un-
popular or powerless., 216 In fact, the First Amendment was designed to
prevent government from intruding upon the freedom of individuals to
worship, not the freedom to abuse members of their communities with
impunity.217 Most forms of religiously motivated conduct should cer-
tainly be beyond the power of courts to punish by imposing civil dam-
ages.218 Passive conduct in particular, such as shunning former members
or denouncing morally errant behavior, should not be banned or re-
stricted simply because the actor is acting upon unpopular beliefs.219 But
jurists are dangerously misguided if they believe that shunning is compa-
rable to battery and rape; the fact that the former is protected should not
be construed as requiring courts to condone the latter scenarios.
Further, tort law already contains an internal mechanism to protect
against the presumptively intolerant majority. A defendant's conduct
must be judged according to what would be reasonable for someone in
the defendant's position, even if that position is occasioned by the defen-
dant's unusual beliefs.22 ° Thus, the law compels courts to tolerate most
religious conduct, however unusual or unpopular, "in order to avoid dis-
tinguishing between 'acceptable' and 'non-acceptable' religions.",22' The
First Amendment, however, does not require society at large to com-
pletely relinquish the power to punish acts that harm the community.222
Religious actors threaten the public safety and welfare as much as anyone
216. MARCi A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
72 (2005).
217. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 579, 596 (1993) ("[T]he government position is one of 'benign neutrality' towards
religion." (footnote omitted)).
218. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Justice Jackson argued:
My own view may be shortly put: I think the limits begin to operate whenever activi-
ties begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public. Religious activi-
ties which concern only members of the faith are and ought to be free-as nearly
absolutely free as anything can be.
Id.
219. See Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir.
1987) ("Without society's tolerance of offenses to sensibility, the protection of religious
differences mandated by the [F]irst [A]mendment would be meaningless.").
220. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW
PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 52 (1985) (stating that religious "beliefs, how-
ever unorthodox ... are part of what determines reasonable prudence").
221. Id.
222. Id.
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else committing violent offenses.223 Where the interest of society at
large, specifically the interest in preventing and punishing violence
against women and children, outweighs the benefit of fostering religious
freedom, it behooves everyone for courts to permit a violence exception
to the free exercise defense.
Fundamentally, the law values people more than the beliefs they hold.
Courts recognize this by, for instance, requiring Christian Scientists to
vaccinate against deadly diseases 224 and forbidding members of the Na-
tive American church from using hallucinogenic drugs in tribal rituals.225
In both cases, courts restricted individuals from engaging in self-destruc-
tive conduct motivated by religious beliefs.226 So why should religious
actors be absolutely entitled to harm others when they have no absolute
right, based on the same beliefs, to harm themselves? If there was ever
an occasion to limit or proscribe religious conduct, it should certainly be
where the conduct is outwardly violent.227 The fact that the violence
causes no physical injury should not spare the actor from taking responsi-
bility for his voluntary acts.
Finally, it bespeaks an appalling lack of regard for minority victims of
religious violence when the law turns a blind eye to their suffering. Mi-
norities, usually vulnerable women and children, are too often victimized
by their religious leaders and fellow parishioners in a manner wholly in-
consistent with the American values of liberty and justice.228 When the
legal system ensures justice for the victims of secular violence, while at
once disregarding the legitimate emotional injuries of victims of relig-
iously motivated violence, the system creates a double standard favoring
the secular victims.2 29 This double standard is especially perilous for mi-
norities, often immigrants, who are most frequently members of insular
religious communities. 23" Nothing in the current approach harms minori-
ties and immigrants more than denying them the same treatment under
the law as everyone else.
223. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
67 (2005).
224. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905).
225. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884
(1990).
226. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38.
227. See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF
LAW 72 (2005).
228. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism:
The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1138 (1996).
229. See id.
230. DAVID E. GUINN, FAITH ON TRIAL: COMMUNITIES OF FAITH, THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT AND THE THEORY OF DEEP DIVERSITY 175 (2002) ("[I]n many cases that these di-
verse religions are also associated with ethnic minorities.").
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The law must protect religious liberty, but not at any cost. Violence
committed upon one member of society is an injustice committed upon
society as a whole. 23 1 While courts rightly reject liability in most civil
cases involving parishioners and religiously motivated conduct, physical
abuse should always be compensable, even if the damage is minor or in-
tangible. Particularly in cases involving religious minorities, pluralism
and tolerance cannot be furthered if minority believers do not receive
equal protection under the law.
IV. CONCLUSION: FREE EXERCISE OF THE COURTROOM
It is time for the legal system to acknowledge that emotional suffering
can be as real and as painful, if not more so, than any physical hurt. For
Laura, this meant cutting herself over one hundred times over the course
of several years while terrified to leave her home and, finally, slitting her
wrists with a box cutter.232 The fact that her pain was caused by a relig-
ious group engaged in religiously motivated conduct does not diminish
the degree or reality of her suffering.
The Texas Supreme Court held that because at least part of Laura's
trauma stemmed from the church members' statements that Laura was
possessed by demonic forces, her injuries arising from the physical con-
tact cannot be distinguished from those caused solely by the discussion of
demons.233 As Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson explains in his dissenting
opinion, "[T]he difficulty in this type of hybrid case lies in separating the
wheat from the chaff." '234 But, as the Chief Justice argues, the wheat and
the chaff may indeed be separated, and a jury may reasonably be in-
structed to award damages only for those mental injuries that would have
been sustained had the physical assault been committed in a secular
context.235
Rejecting the Chief Justice's suggestion, the majority argues:
[E]ven though the elements of a common law tort may be defined by
secular principles without regard to religion, it does not necessarily
follow that application of those principles to impose civil tort liability
231. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
67 (2005).
232. In re Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 174 S.W.3d 388, 393 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2005), rev'd, 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1003 (2009).
233. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 10-11 (Tex. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1003 (2009).
234. Id. at 21 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
235. Id.
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would not run afoul of protections the constitution affords to a
church's right to construe and administer church doctrine.236
Attempting to compensate some of Laura's injuries, when even her psy-
chologist could not assign a percentage to those injuries that were solely
caused by the physical contact, the court reasoned, would have an uncon-
stitutional chilling effect on the church's freedom to practice its core
beliefs.23 7
I argue that courts need not attempt to separate the wheat from the
chaff, nor must a plaintiff's claim for intangible harms be thrown out sim-
ply because the court is unable, or unwilling, to do so. The bright-line
standard I advocate-compensating all victims of religiously motivated
violence, regardless of the nature of their injuries-does not require
courts to tread lightly where the imposition of liability would have a chil-
ling effect on religious practice. On the contrary, liability should have a
chilling effect where religious practice is violent. If the threat of liability
for intangible harms does not deter religious groups from abusing their
own members, there can be no protection for minority religious adher-
ents, especially those women and children so often lacking a voice outside
of the courtroom.
Women and children like Laura Schubert will never be fully protected
under the law until courts acknowledge intangible suffering as a legiti-
mate injury in cases involving religious violence. Those women and chil-
dren who are members of insulated religious communities, in particular,
can never be safe from abuse if courts continue to place the free exercise
rights of religious institutions above the rights of minority congregants to
physical and emotional well-being. After all, "there is no constitutional
right to harm others simply because the conduct is religiously moti-
vated. '238 When courts excuse violent conduct, they effectively create
such a right in complete disregard for the victims of violence.
I do not argue for a radical change in the law as it stands today. In fact,
I find it hard to contemplate many scenarios in which violent, abusive
conduct would produce only intangible damages. Certainly, the most bla-
tantly abusive behavior most often produces readily compensable physi-
cal injuries, the kind that courts have never been hesitant to remedy. I
236. Id. at 10 (majority opinion) (citing Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 400
(Tex. 2007), reh'g denied (Sept. 28, 2007)) (emphasis in original).
237. Id.
238. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
11 (2005) ("Therefore the rule of law ... must be applied evenhandedly to all religious
entities. Legislatures can exempt the religious from some laws, but only where the relig-
ious entities have borne the burden of proving that exempting them renders no harm.").
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merely suggest that the free exercise defense should be permitted only if
the religiously motivated conduct was non-violent.
For Laura, the pain and suffering she has endured for over ten years
cannot be erased by a monetary reward. However, a favorable decision
in her case could have helped minority victims of religious abuse through-
out the United States.23 9 The First Amendment protects a precious right
of all Americans: the freedom to worship without fear of governmental
persecution. For adherents of minority faiths, this right is particularly sa-
cred because it prevents the majority from silencing the expression of
those beliefs that are different or unusual. But for those adherents whose
faith exposes them to violence in religion's name, nothing can be more
sacred than the freedom to exercise the courtroom to demand justice.
239. Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Laura's
case on January 21, 2009. Schubert v. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 129 S.Ct. 1003,
1003 (2009).
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